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Prenatal Fraud: Untruth And The
Consequences For The Drug
Manufacturer
While a misrepresentation of fact occurs in virtually every tort,' in
most instances the other elements of the tort are of greater concern to
the courts and the misrepresentation is not actionable.2 Tort law, how-
ever, has developed the separate action of deceit 3 to permit recovery for
injuries resulting from misrepresentations of fact.4 While this tort is
normally used when the injured party has suffered economic losses, a
number of courts permit the action when the misrepresentation also
causes physical injuries.5 The cause of action is generally based upon
the tortfeasor's intentional conduct, even though the action also can be
based upon negligence or strict liability theories.6
One of the most serious types of intentional deceit involves misrepre-
1. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS §105 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter
cited as PROSSER]. The tortfeasor uses the misrepresentation to help accomplish the tort. Thus, a
person's negligent conduct includes a misrepresentation that he is exercising reasonable care to-
ward the injured party. Similarly, a misrepresentation that the tortfeasor has a right to be on the
land is frequently implicit in the tort of trespass.
2. PROSSER, supra note 1, at §105.
3. "Deceit" generally refers to a misrepresentation which involves tortious conduct, while
the term "fraud" refers to a misrepresentation involving a contract. PROSSER, supra note 1, at
§105, see note 55 infra. The words, however, frequently are used interchangeably and this com-
ment will use both terms to refer to a misrepresentation for which the injured party seeks relief.
4. 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS §7.1 (1956) [hereinafter cited as HARPER &
JAMES]; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §557A (1977) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT].
5. See PROSSER, supra note 1, at §105 and HARPER & JAMES, supra note 4, at §7.1 for a
discussion of the origins of the action for deceit. The action historically arose out of business
transactions and thus misrepresentations causing physical injuries were treated differently from
misrepresentations which caused only pecuniary losses. In some courts the deceit action was not
available when physical injuries were suffered. See Food Fair, Inc. v. Anderson, 282 So. 2d 150,
153 (Fla. Ct. App. 1980) (dictum that injury in a deceit action is ordinarily of only a pecuniary
nature); PROSSER, supra note 1, at §105; RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, at §525. Other courts, how-
ever, permit the deceit action when the injured party suffers physical or property injury. See, e.g.,
Graham v. John R. Watts & Son, 238 Ky. 96, 106, 36 S.W.2d 859, 864 (1931) (damage to plaintiffs
land); Flaherty v. Till, 119 Minn. 191, 192, 137 N.W. 815, 816 (1912); Tullock v. Haselo, 218 A.D.
313, 317, 218 N.Y.S. 139, 141 (1926) (an action for deceit for personal injuries is available when
causation between the misrepresentation and injury is present); Kuelling v. Roderick Lean Mfg.
Co., 183 N.Y. 78, 89, 75 N.E. 1098, 1102 (1905) (physical injury to plaintiff); Hoar v. Rasmusen,
229 Wis. 509, 513, 282 N.W. 652, 654 (1938) (inflamation of the skin caused by medication made
by the defendant). California has adopted the latter view and permits recovery for physical inju-
ries arising from a tortfeasor's misrepresentation. See, e.g., Hauter v. Zogarts, 14 Cal. 3d 104, 113-
14, 534 P.2d 377, 382-83, 120 Cal. Rptr. 681, 686-87 (1975); Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251
Cal. App. 2d 689, 706-08, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398, 410-12 (1970); 4 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFOR-
NIA LAW, Torts, §479 (8th ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as WITKIN].
6. PROSSER, supra note 1, at §107.
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sentations by drug manufacturers to unsuspecting drug users. False
claims about drug safety induce persons to take drugs that cause seri-
ous and often irreparable harm. Misrepresentations about drugs for
use by expectant mothers warrant particular attention because of the
great likelihood that the drugs will injure the fetus.7 In such instances
the expectant mother has a cause of action for deceit against the drug
manufacturer, but courts have yet to permit the fetus to recover for the
misrepresentation."
Tort law is unique in its ability to provide remedies for injuries. If
the plaintiff in a tort action is asserting injury to a legally recognized
interest "the mere fact that the claim is novel will not of itself operate
as a bar to the remedy."9 The limits of tort law recovery are constantly
changing as courts recognize new interests worthy of legal protection.
California follows this principle of broad recovery for tortious injuries
in Civil Code Section 3281,10 which has been characterized as provid-
ing a remedy for every wrong." Nevertheless, tort recovery is not
without its limits and some limitations may affect the ability of the
child to recover for a manufacturer's prenatal misrepresentation.
When the misrepresentation involves drug safety and results in in-
jury to a fetus,' 2 the plaintiff' 3 must overcome problems of judicial re-
luctance to recognize the action and problems of proof. The judicial
constraints involve two concerns. The court must initially determine if
a legally recognized interest has been injured.'4 In a prenatal fraud
7. An example of the serious injuries which a drug can inflict upon a fetus is seen in the
situation of the drug Diethylstilbestrol (DES). The drug, which was administered to expectant
mothers to prevent miscarmages, has been shown to cause cancerous growths in women who re-
ceived the drug while a fetus. See Sindell v. Abbott Lab., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 593-94, 607 P.2d 924,
925, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 133 (1980); Comment, DES and a Proposed Theory of Enterprise Liabilty,
46 FORDHAM L. REV. 963 (1977-78). A recently published article describes the drug bendectin,
which also has been administered to expectant mothers and appears to cause birth defects in the
fetuses which received the drug. See Dowie & Marshall, The h'endectin Cover-Up, MOTHER
JONES, November, 1980, at 42. Finally, the Thalidomide controversy of the mid-1960's, when
mothers who were given the drug gave birth to children with many deformities and defects caused
by the drug, shows the devastating effects a drug can have upon a fetus. Id. at 44-45.
8. See notes 31-44 and accompanying text infra.
9. PROSSER, supra note 1, at §1.
10. CAL. CIV. CODE §3281 provides that "(e)very person who suffers detriment from the un-
lawful act or omission of another, may recover from the person in fault a compensation therefor in
money, which is called damages."
11. Curlender v. Bio-Science Lab., 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 830, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477, 489 (1980).
12. This comment will use the term "prenatal fraud" to refer to the situation when a manu-
facturer misrepresents the qualities of a drug to be used by expectant mothers and the child is born
with a drug-caused injury. The child subsequently seeks to recovery for the manufactureres mis-
representation.
13. The plaintiff in a prenatal fraud action is the child who is born with the drug-caused
injury. This comment will use the term "prenatal fraud plaintiff" to designate this individual.
14. See Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421,429,404 A.2d 8, 12-13 (1979); WITKIN, supra note 5, at§9.
The term damnum absque injuria (loss without injury in the legal sense) is used by the courts
when the injured party has been damaged, but no legally-recognized interest of the party has been
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case the court must find that the fetus itself has legal rights which can
be injured by the expectant mother's reliance on a manufacturer's state-
ments. Courts have been reluctant to find that fetuses have legally rec-
ognized interests, and have frequently distinguished the fight of the
parents to recover for their injuries and the fight of the child to recover
for his, even though the same tortious conduct injured both the parents
and the child.15
The second judicial limitation involves concern for exposing a
tortfeasor to unlimited liability. This is an important concern in cases
involving misrepresentations about drug safety since any action could
involve a very large number of potential plaintiffs. Typically, the mis-
representations of drug safety are not made by the manufacturer to a
few specific individuals, but are contained in advertisements given wide
publicity and distribution.' 6 Courts will not expose a tortfeasor to un-
limited liability, and the potential for great liability often has been
cited as a reason for denying recovery to a particular party.'
7
A plaintiff in a prenatal fraud action also faces problems of proof
quite different from judicial reluctance concerns. 18 Certain elements of
the action for fraud may be difficult to show. The elements of the com-
mon law tort of intentional deceit are: (1) a false representation of ma-
terial facts made by the tortfeasor; (2) "scienter", knowledge or belief
by the tortfeasor that the representation is untrue; (3) an intent on the
part of the tortfeasor to induce the injured party to rely on the misrep-
resentation; (4) justified reliance on the misrepresentation by the in-
jured party; and (5) damages sustained as a result of the justified
affected. Hardyman v. Collins, 80 F. Supp. 501, 512-13 (D.C. Cal. 1948) (denying recovery under
8 U.S.C. 47(3) for claim that defendants prevented the plaintiffs from holding a meeting of a
local political party to adopt resolutions criticizing the government); Rose v. State, 19 Cal. 2d 713,
729, 123 P.2d 505, 515 (1942) (permitting recovery for damage to plaintiff's land resulting from
construction of a subway which impaired access to plaintiffs land); Roach v. Hostetter, 48 Cal.
App. 2d 375, 379, 119 P.2d 749,751 (1941) (denying recovery for alleged violation of a covenant to
build an industrial area on land the plaintiff purchased from the defendant); J.A. & C.E. Bennett
v. Winston-Salem Southbound R. Co., 170 N.C. 389, 390, 87 S.E. 133, 134 (1915) (denying recov-
ery for damage to property caused by change in street grade when no negligence in work shown
and no statutory or constitutional remedy is provided).
Even if a legally-recognized interest has been invaded, however, the injured party can still be
denied recovery if there has been no damage suffered. See notes 118-123 and accompanying text
infra.
15. See notes 31-38 and accompanying text infra.
16. See note 91 and accompanying text infra.
17. See, eg., Baxter v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. 3d 461, 463, 563 P.2d 871, 872, 138 Cal. Rptr.
315, 316 (1977); Borer v. American Airlines, 19 Cal. 3d 441, 446, 563 P.2d 858, 861, 138 Cal. Rptr.
302, 305 (1977); Garza v. Kantor, 54 Cal. App. 3d 1025, 1028, 127 Cal. Rptr. 164, 165 (1976). But
see Sindell v. Abbott Lab., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 611-12, 607 P.2d 924, 936-37, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 144-45
(1980). The court permitted the plaintiff to impose upon the defendant manufacturers the burden
of proving the plaintiff's DES-caused injury was not caused by the defendant's drug. Such a shift
of the burden of proof will expose the manufacturer to much greater liability.
18. See notes 14-17 and accompanying text supra.
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reliance.' 9 The tort of deceit thus requires that both the tortfeasor and
the injured party act.20 The elements of misrepresentation, "scienter,"
and damages are no different in a prenatal fraud case than in any other
drug manufacturer deceit action. The major obstacles to recovery for
prenatal fraud, therefore, lie in showing that the manufacturer in-
tended the fetus to rely on the misrepresentation and that the fetus jus-
tifiably relied on the misrepresentation.
This comment will determine whether California law permits a per-
son to maintain a cause of action against a drug manufacturer for the
intentional tort of deceit if the misrepresentation was made when the
plaintiff was a fetus. The law of deceit will be examined to determine
when a child2 can recover for prenatal fraud committed by a drug
manufacturer. 2 The comment must initially consider whether Califor-
nia will permit any action to recover for prenatal tortious injuries.23
The circumstances under which a drug manufacturer may be liable for
a misrepresentation about its drug will then be explored.24 The focus
of the comment will be, however, upon the elements of intent to induce
reliance25 and justified reliance, 6 as they pose the greatest obstacles to
prenatal fraud recovery. The child must use the reliance of his or her
mother and the attending physician to maintain a cause of action for
prenatal fraud since the fetus is unable to directly rely on a misrepre-
19. Hobart v. Hobart Estate Co., 26 Cal. 2d 412, 422, 159 P.2d 958, 964 (1945); Harazim v.
Lynam, 267 Cal. App. 2d 127, 128, 72 Cal. Rptr. 670, 672 (1968); Cohen v. Citizens Nat'l. Trust &
Sav. Bank, 143 Cal. App..2d 480,483, 300 P.2d 14, 16 (1956). See generally PROSSER, supra note i,
at §105; HARPER & JAMES, supra note 4, at §7.1; WITKlI, supra note 5, at §446.
20. In contrast, a person can be injured by intentional torts such as trespass, assault, or bat-
tery, or by negligent conduct of the tortfeasor without taking any affirmative conduct. In a deceit
action, however, the injured party must actually rely and change positions due to the misrepresen-
tation before recovery can be granted. See notes 103-117 and accompanying text infra.
21. The prenatal fraud plaintiff typically will be a child when the action is initiated. The
effects of the drug induced injury may not be discovered, however, until the plaintiff is an adult.
See Sindell v. Abbott Lab., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 594, 607 P.2d 924, 995, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 133 (1980);
Comment, DES and a Proposed Theory ofEnterprise Liability, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 963 (1977-
78). When the injury is not discovered immediately after birth, the plaintiffhas six years from the
time the injury should have been discovered to bring the action. See Segura v. Brundage, 91 Cal.
App. 3d 19, 24, 153 Cal. Rptr. 777, 779 (1979). That the prenatal fraud plaintiff may be an adult
when the action is brought thus does not automatically bar the action. In this comment, however,
the prenatal fraud plaintiff is presumed to be a child. See note 13 supra.
22. To retain this narrow focus the comment will not discuss drug manufacturer liability for
neglgent misrepresentations, nor will it consider product liability theories as they apply to drugs.
This comment will also not investigate the complex and difficult question of whether a fetus is a
person, since the prenatal fraud action in California is not contingent upon that issue. See note 37
infra. Finally, while it as been called the key to a prenatal fraud action, Los Angeles Daily J.,
October 20, 1980, at 1, col. 4, this comment will not consider the recent case of Curlender v. Bio-
Science Lab., 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 447 (1980) and the area of wrongful life claims,
since the Curlender court defined such claims as based upon negligence principles, id. at 829, 165
Cal. Rptr. at 488.
23. See notes 45-63 and accompanying text infra.
24. See notes 64-124 and accompanying text infra.
25. See notes 127-214 and accompanying text infra.
26. See notes 215-235 and accompanying text infra.
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sentation. Three theories that may permit the prenatal fraud plaintiff
to recover will be investigated. The first theory involves a misrepresen-
tation directed to the public by the use of advertising and the mass
media.27 The second theory involves a misrepresentation made to a
third person with the intent it would be repeated to the injured party.28
The final theory provides the strongest support for a prenatal fraud
action and involves a misrepresentation made to the injured party's
representative.29 Each approach, however, has limitations3" and thus
the prenatal fraud action likely will require a combination of the theo-
ries. The comment will conclude a plaintiff can recover for a prenatal
fraud committed by a drug manufacturer, but the ability to recover de-
pends upon the nature of the drug administered.
RECOVERY FOR PRENATAL ToRTIous INJURIES
The first obstacle facing the prenatal fraud plaintiff is determining
whether California will permit a fetus to have any cause of action. A
prenatal fraud action can be maintained only if the courts will grant
recovery for prenatal injuries tortiously received. The initial inquiry
looks at whether the fetus has legally recognized interests that can be
injured. This requires looking at the common law theories and at Cali-
fornia's statutory scheme to see under what circumstances prenatal tor-
tious injuries can be compensated.
A. Common Law Recovery for Prenatal Injuries
At early common law the child was denied recovery for tortious inju-
ries suffered while a fetus.3" Courts cited the danger of double recovery
by the parent and child for the same tortious conduct of the defend-
27. See notes 87-102, 132-141 and accompanying text infra.
28. See notes 142-165 and accompanying text infra.
29. See notes 166-214 and accompanying text infra.
30. For example, the misrepresentation to the public approach directly affects the fetus, but
since the fetus cannot rely on the misrepresentation, the issue of third party reliance is raised. See
note 141 and accompanying text infra. Under the second theory involving a misrepresentation
recommunicated via a third person, the fetus cannot directly hear the misrepresentation. See
notes 161-163 and accompanying text infra. Finally, the third theory of misrepresentation to a
representative requires finding the physician or the expectant mother was acting as the fetus' rep-
resentative. See note 164 and accompanying text infra.
Under each theory the fetus must use the reliance of its agent or representative to maintain a
prenatal fraud cause of action. See notes 215-235 and accompanying text infra. The fetus cannot
contract for an agent, but this fact will not preclude a prenatal fraud action. See note 182 and
accompanying text infra. The attending physician is acting as the representative of the fetus in
providing medical treatment. See notes 183-189 and 218-226 and accompanying text infra. Simi-
larly, the expectant mother is acting in a representative capacity as the guardian of the fetus. See
notes 190-195 and accompanying text infra.
31. WInhN, supra note 5, at §379. See Mallison v. Pomeroy, 205 Or. 690, 692-95, 291 P.2d
225, 226-28 (1955) for an excellent discussion on the development of the common law regarding
prenatal tortious injury recovery.
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ant,32 the inability of damages to adequately compensate the child,33
the fear of fraudulent claims, 34 the difficulty of proof regarding in-
jury,35 and the lack of precedent 36 as reasons recovery was denied. The
principal reason for denying recovery, however, seems to have been the
unwillingness of the courts to recognize any legal existence of the fetus
independent of its mother.37 The courts thus would deny the child re-
covery for prenatal injuries while permitting the parents to recover for
their physical and economic injuries.38
In recent years the courts have begun to recognize that the fetus
32. See Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cal. 3d 564, 570, 565 P.2d 122, 126, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97, 101
(1977); Garza v. Kantor, 54 Cal. App. 2d 1025, 1028, 127 Cal. Rptr. 164, 165 (1976).
33. Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 707-08, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652, 657-58 (1976); Gleitman
v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 28, 227 A.2d 689, 692 (1967). Accord, Baxter v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. 3d
461, 464, 563 P.2d 871, 873, 138 Cal. Rptr. 315, 317 (1977).
34. Bronbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138, 142-43 (D.D.C. 1946); Keyes v. Construction Serv.
Inc., 340 Mass. 633, 636, 165 N.E.2d 913, 914 (1960).
35. 340 Mass. at 635-36, 165 N.E. at 914; 205 Or. at 693, 291 P.2d at 228.
36. 340 Mass. at 635, 165 N.E.2d at 914; Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421,427,404 A.2d 8, 12-13
(1979); Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 359, 157 A.2d 497, 503 (1960).
37. 65 F. Supp. at 139; 340 Mass. at 635, 165 N.E.2d at 914; 31 N.J. at 359, 157 A.2d at 503.
See also Byrne, The Legal Rights of the Unborn Child, 41 Los ANGELES BAR BULL. 24 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as Byrne]; Comment, Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth Causes ofAction-Sug-
gestionsfor a Consistent Analysis, 63 MARQ. L. REV. 611, 641 (1980). A fetus is denied the Consti-
tutional protection of due process of law since it is not a "person" under the fourteenth amend-
ment. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 157-58 (1973).
Arguably, since a fetus is not a "person" it cannot have an agent to represent it. If a fetus
cannot have an agent, a prenatal fraud action is not available since the fetus must use the reliance
of its agent or representative to maintain a cause of action. See note 165 and accompanying text
infra.
Assuming arguendo that only a person can have an agent or representative act on his or her
behalf, the inquiry must turn to when, if ever, a fetus becomes a "person"? Determining whether
a fetus is a person is beyond the scope of this comment, and the question is the subject of great
controversy and confusion in legal and medical circles. See 410 U.S. at 159; TIME, April 6, 1981,
at 23. Upon initial inspection, a fetus perhaps could be a person after the first trimester of a
pregnancy, since up to that time an expectant mother has a right to terminate the pregnancy
without any state intervention. 410 U.S. at 163. Closer examination reveals, however, that the
Supreme Court selected the first trimester standard because of medical information relating to the
woman's health. Id. Consequently, the abortion cases provide no insight into when a fetus be-
comes a person.
The prenatal fraud plaintiff, however, does not have to prove that a fetus is a person. Represen-
tative relationships have long been recognized although one of the parties is incapable of con-
tracting. See notes 183-184 and 190-195 and accompanying text infra. In addition, the fetus has
frequently been considered by the courts as having been born for a number of purposes, including
having a guardian appointed for it. I W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *126. Using traditional
theories of law, therefore, a fetus can have a representative act on its behalf, and a cause of action
for prenatal fraud is possible even though the fetus cannot contract.
38. This has most recently occurred in the "wrongful life" cases in which the child plaintiff
seeks damages for his birth. For example, in Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979), the
parents were permitted to recover for their mental and emotional injuries caused by the defend-
ant's negligence in failing to diagnose that the child would be born suffering from "Down's Syn-
drome." The child, however, was denied recovery, principally because the court would not
recognize that the child had a right to not be born. Id. at 431, 404 A.2d at 12. The distinction
between recovery granted the parent and child for injuries arising from the same conduct was also
applied in the California case of Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1976),
in which the defendant negligently performed a therapeutic abortion and the plaintiff parent sub-
sequently became pregnant. The mother was granted recovery for her pain and suffering and
costs, while the child was denied recovery. Id. at 709, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 658-59.
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does have interests entitled to legal protection. 9 The most significant
factor leading to this change has been judicial recognition of the in-
dependent legal existence of the fetus."n Courts now view that many
rights exist in the fetus from the time of conception.4' For example,
courts permit a fetus to be a party to litigation even before it is born,
42
and courts will appoint a guardian for the fetus when the circumstances
warrant.43 Courts also will permit the child to recover for physical in-
juries negligently inflicted upon the fetus in an action independent of
the parents' action.' This modern trend toward granting recovery for
prenatal injuries is similar to the California statutory position.
B. California Recovery for Prenatal Injuries
California has changed the common law and given statutory recogni-
tion to the independent legal existence of the fetus.45 Civil Code Sec-
39. Curlender v. Bio-Science Lab., 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 825-26, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477, 486
(1980); 31 N.J. at 362-63, 157 A.2d at 503-04; OP. CAL. LEGISL. COUNSEL No. 14545 (April 27,
1967); Noonan, The Constitutionali y of the Regulation ofAbortions, 21 HASTINGS L.J. 51 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Noonan].
40. See generally WITKIN, supra note 5, at §379; Byrne, supra note 37, at 26. Some courts,
however, will recognize the independent status of the fetus only when it has become "viable." See
Keyes v. Construction Serv. Inc., 340 Mass. 633, 636, 165 N.E.2d 912, 914 (1960); 31 N.J. at 366-
67, 157 A.2d at 504.
41. 55 Cal. App. 3d at 709, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 658-59; 80 N.J. at 431, 404 A.2d at 12; Gleitman
v. Cosgrove, 49 NJ. 22, 28, 227 A.2d 689, 692 (1967); Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 411, 413
N.Y.S.2d 895, 900, 386 N.E.2d 807, 812 (1978). See generally Byrne, supra note 37, at 26; Noonan,
supra note 39, at 58. Judicial recognition of a fetus' legal rights is consistent with the traditional
protection courts have given the child. See, e.g., Johnston v. Southern Pac. Co., 150 Cal. 535, 538,
89 P. 348, 350 (1907) (courts will not permit a child to be prejudiced by his own acts); In re Phillip
B., 92 Cal. App. 3d 796, 801-02, 156 Cal. Rptr., 48, 51 (1979) (state has the right and the duty to
protect children); Sparks v. Sparks, 101 Cal. App. 2d 129, 137, 225 P.2d 238, 243 (1950) (the law
shields minors from their lack of judgment and experience).
42. Kyne v. Kyne, 38 Cal. App. 2d 122, 126, 100 P.2d 806, 808 (1940).
43. Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Mem. Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 423, 201 A.2d 537,
538 (1964) (appointment of a special guardian to permit a blood transfusion for the mother, who
refused to permit a transfusion on religious grounds, even though both she and the fetus could
otherwise die).
44. See Segura v. Brundage, 91 Cal. App. 3d 19, 25, 153 Cal. Rptr. 777, 780 (1979); Smith v.
Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 365, 157 A.2d 497, 504-05 (1960).
45. CAL. CIV. CODE §29; Norman v. Murphy, 124 Cal. App. 2d 95, 98, 268 P.2d 178, 180
(1954); 38 Cal. App. 2d at 127, 100 P.2d at 809; Scott v. McPheeters, 33 Cal. App. 2d 629, 632-33,
92 P.2d 678, 680-81 (1939).
The judicial reluctance in providing protection for the fetus in tort law differs significantly from
the treatment given the fetus in property law. The fetus is able to inherit property and is consid-
ered a life in being for purposes of the Rule Against Perpetuities. T. BERGIN & P. HASKELL,
PREFACE TO ESTATES IN LAND AND FUTURE INTERESTS 192 (1966); 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COM-
MENTARIES *126. Strong policy considerations underscore the appropriateness of permitting Sec-
tion 29 to govern a prenatal fraud action.
The prenatal fraud plaintiff'would have been physically injured by the drug. See note 7 supra.
Section 29 permits compensation for personal injuries wrongfully inflicted by wilful or negligent
acts of another. 33 Cal. App. 2d at 632, 92 P.2d at 680. The entire focus of tort law is the compen-
sation of injured parties. PROSSER, supra note 1, at §1. The prenatal fraud action involves an
intentional tort and requires that the drug manufacturer know that its statements about drug
safety were false. Under such circumstances, permitting a prenatal fraud cause of action under
Section 29 would be the most appropriate and just approach, and would be consistent with the
traditional role of tort law.
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tion 29 provides that a "(c)hild conceived, but not yet born, is to be
deemed an existing person, so far as may be necessary for its interests
in the event of its subsequent birth .. ."46 By recognizing that the
fetus is a "life in being" from the time of conception, the statute im-
poses a duty on the tortfeasor to act reasonably to avoid injuring the
fetus.47 As a result of the statute, the fetus has interests that courts will
legally protect.4 8 The statute does have judicially-imposed limitations
that must be considered to determine if the limitations could preclude
an action for prenatal fraud.
The statute is potentially limitless in the scope of its coverage as it
protects everything which is profitable or beneficial to the child.4 9
Courts, however, have placed limits on the right to recover for prenatal
injuries. For example, the fetus must be born alive before Section 29
applies.5 0 The most significant limitations on the right to recover for
prenatal injuries involve wrongful death claims and actions under
criminal statutes. California courts consistently have denied parents
recovery for the wrongful death of their stillborn child,5' and also have
denied the child recovery for the wrongful death of its parent if the
parent died while the child was a fetus. 2 The courts refuse to extend
the protection of the wrongful death statute to cover prenatal injuries
because the remedy is statutorily-created and the statute does not spe-
cifically protect the fetus.53 Since courts narrowly construe criminal
statutes they also will refuse to find that the word "person" in a crimi-
nal statute includes a fetus.
5 4
46. CAL. CIV. CODE §29.
47. WITKi., supra note 5, at §379; Noonan, supra note 39, at 58. California therefore has
eliminated the need to decide whether a fetus is a person under Section 29. See note 37 m.slra.
The only requirement for recovery is that the fetus be born alive and is not claiming recovery
under a unique statutory right. See note 50 and accompanying text infra.
48. The courts have used the statute to permit recovery when the fetus was injured before, see
91 Cal. App. 3d at 24, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 779, and during birth, 33 Cal. App. 2d at 631, 92 P.2d at
680. See generally Noonan, supra note 34.
The interests which Section 29 protects include the right to be compensated for personal injuries
caused by the wilful or negligent act of another. 33 Cal. App. 2d at 632, 92 P.2d at 680.
49. 33 Cal. App. 2d at 631, 92 P.2d at 680.
50. Reyna v. City and County of San Francisco, 69 Cal. App. 3d 876, 880, 138 Cal. Rptr. 504,
507 (1977); Norman v. Murphy, 124 Cal. App. 2d 95, 98, 268 P.2d 178, 179-80 (1954).
51. 69 Cal. App. 3d at 880-81, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 507; Bayer v. Suttle, 23 Cal. App. 3d 361, 364-
65, 100 Cal. Rptr. 212, 214-15 (1972); 124 Cal. App. 2d at 98, 268 P.2d at 179-80. The court in
Norman refused to permit the parents to recover for either their own injuries or for any injuries
the fetus might have suffered before birth. 124 Cal. App. 2d at 98, 268 P.2d at 180.
52. Daubert v. Western Meat Co., 139 Cal. 480, 483, 73 P. 244, 245 (1903).
53. 69 Cal. App. 3d at 880-81, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 507; 23 Cal. App. 3d at 364-65, 100 Cal. Rptr.
at 214-15; 124 Cal. App. 2d at 98, 268 P.2d at 180. California appears to be in the minority when it
denies recovery for the wrongful death of the fetus. 23 Cal. App. 3d at 363, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 213.
About half the states now permit the parents to recover for the stillborn child and the trend is
toward granting recovery. See Kronisch, Wrong/ul Death, Wrong/u/ Birth, Wrongfu Ljfe, TaIAL,
December 1980, at 34.
54. Keeler v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 619, 470 P.2d 617, 87 Cal. Rptr. 481 (1970). The
defendant was charged under California Penal Code Section 187 with the murder of his ex-wife's
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These cases, however, do not prevent the application of Section 29 to
a prenatal fraud action. While the tort of deceit is now governed by
statute,5 5 the statutes merely codify the common law in California.56
Thus, if recovery under Section 29 were denied because the deceit ac-
tion has been codified, the section would be virtually repealed since tort
law in California is governed by statute.57 Courts, however, have per-
mitted a plaintiff to use Section 29 to recover for a tortfeasor's negli-
gence during and before birth. 8 Consequently, recovery for injuries
based upon common law torts are within the legal interests protected
by Section 29. The criminal statute rationale5 9 also would not apply
since a prenatal fraud involves a civil tort action and courts will recog-
nize broad recovery rights for tortious injuries." Section 29 thus per-
mits the child to bring an action for prenatal fraud.
Although freedom from prenatal fraud is among the interests given
legal protection by Section 29, that fact alone is not sufficient for recov-
unborn child. At the time of the incident and prosecution the statute limited murder to the killing
of aperson. After Keeler was decided, the legislature amended Section 187 to define murder as
the killing of a human being or afetus. The decision in Keeler is consistent with the historical
view of the courts to give criminal statutes a strict or narrow construction in favor of the defend-
ant. See, e.g., U.S. v. Braverman, 373 U.S. 405, 408 (1963); Yates v. U.S., 354 U.S. 298, 304
(1957); U.S. v. Dunlap, 573 F.2d 1092, 1094 (9th Cir. 1978); U.S. v. Gidley, 426 F. Supp. 624, 627
(N.D. Cal. 1976); People v. Backus, 23 Cal. 3d 360, 383, 590 P.2d 837, 850, 152 Cal. Rptr. 710, 723
(1979); Hale v. Morgan, 22 Cal. 3d 388, 405, 584 P.2d 512, 523, 149 Cal. Rptr. 375, 386 (1978). But
see People v. Fields, 105 Cal. App. 3d 341, 343, 164 Cal. Rptr. 336, 337-38 (1980); People v.
Upchurch, 76 Cal. App. 3d 721, 723, 143 Cal. Rptr. 113, 114 (1978).
55. CAL. CIV. CODE §§1572 (action for fraud in contracts), 1709-1711 (action for deceit in
tort).
56. Compare PROSSER, supra note 1, at §105 and WITKIN, supra note 5, at §446 with Hobart
v. Hobart Estate Co., 26 Cal. 2d 412, 422, 159 P.2d 958, 964 (1946) and Cohen v. Citizens Nat'l
Trust & Say., 143 Cal. App. 2d 480, 483, 300 P.2d 14, 16 (1956).
57. See, eg., CAL. CIv. CODE §§44 (defamation); 3342.5 (tTespass); CAL. PENAL CODE §§233
(infliction of mental distress), 236 (false imprisonment), 240-242 (assault and battery), 602 (tres-
pass).
Naturally, courts are not completely constrained by the limitations imposed by statute. Courts
often "make law" without any statutory foundation. After the courts have spoken the legislature
will frequently react to what it perceives as "bad law". See note 54 supra for a discussion of one
instance when the legislature reacted to an unpopular judicial decision.
Arguably, since the legislature has not revised the statutes governing deceit and misrepresenta-
tion to permit an action for prenatal fraud, such an action is not available under Section 29. This
position, however, presumes that the legislature will normally act in advance of a perceived need.
More frequently the legislature enacts a law after the proscribed conduct is brought to its attention
as worthy of legislative consideration.
To date, only one lower court has been found which has considered whether an action for
prenatal fraud is possible, LA. Daily Journal, October 20, 1980, at 1, col. 4, and no appellate court
has yet to decide the issue. Consequently, the fact that the legislature has not addressed the ques-
tion is not indicative of the legislature's views on the availability of the cause of action. In the
absence of legislative guidance, the case law suggests that recovery for the intentional tort of
prenatal fraud is proper and permitted under Section 29. See Scott v. McPheeters, 33 Cal. App.
2d 629, 632, 92 P.2d 678, 680 (1939).
58. Myers v. Stevenson, 125 Cal. App. 2d 399, 407, 270 P.2d 885, 890 (1954) (defendant's
negligence before and during birth caused injury); 33 Cal. App. 2d at 631, 92 P.2d at 680 (defend-
ant's negligence during birth caused injury).
59. See note 54 and accompanying text supra.
60. See notes 10-11 and acompanying text supra.
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ery. The prenatal fraud plaintiff must still prove the elements of the
tort of deceit to recover. The general principles governing recovery for
deceit apply in both a typical drug misrepresentation situation and a
prenatal fraud action. The prenatal fraud action, however, has special
problems in finding the drug manufacturer's intent to induce fetal reli-
ance and the fetus' justified reliance.6t These problems are best ex-
amined after first looking at a typical situation when the manufacturer
makes misrepresentations about drugs used by the general public.
62
Once it is determined how the deceit action will lie in the typical situa-
tion the more specific and difficult situation of prenatal fraud will be
discussed.63
TORT OF DECEIT BY A DRUG MANUFACTURER
The principles of the common law govern the modem action for de-
ceit, although the tort is now statutorily based.64 To recover, the in-
jured party must prove: (1) a false representation of a material fact
made by the tortfeasor; (2) "scienter", or knowledge by the tortfeasor
that the statement is false; (3) an intent by the tortfeasor to induce the
injured party to rely on the misrepresentation; (4) the injured party's
justified reliance on the misrepresentation; and (5) damages as a result
of the justified reliance."
-4. Misrepresentations by Drug Manufacturers
A deceit action can be maintained only when a misrepresentation of
material fact has occurred. The misrepresentation can be either a mis-
statement of fact or a failure to disclose facts when the tortfeasor is
under a duty of full disclosure.66 The duty to reveal information arises
61. See notes 125-126 and acompanying text infra.
62. See notes 64-124 and accompanying text infra. In the typical drug misrepresentation case
discussed in this section the misrepresentation can pertain to a drug which would be used by the
general public and not used only by expectant mothers during their pregnancy. The typical drug
misrepresentation situation can involve either a prescription drug or a general over-the-counter
drug.
63. See notes 124-235 and accompanying text infra. This comment focuses on the elements
associated with an intentional misrepresentation since that tort poses the most difficult problem of
proof for the prenatal fraud plaintiff. See notes 82, 142-165 and accompanying text infra. In
addition, should the prenatal fraud plaintiff prove the tortfeasor acted with malice or showed
conscious disregard for the safety of others by his conduct, punitive damages could be awarded.
Taylor v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. 3d 890, 899, 598 P.2d 854, 860, 157 Cal. Rptr. 693, 699 (1979); see
CAL. CIv. CODE §3294 (describing when exemplary damages are allowed.
64. See note 55 supra.
65. Hobart v. Hobart Estate Co., 26 Cal. 2d 412, 422, 159 P.2d 958, 964 (1945); Cohen v.
Citizens Nat'l. Trust & Say., 143 Cal. App. 2d 480, 483, 300 P.2d 14, 16 (1956).
66. See, e.g., Hauter v. Zogarts, 14 Cal. 3d 104, 534 P.2d 377, 120 Cal. Rptr. 681 (1975)
(representation the product was safe); Nathanson v. Murphy, 132 Cal. App. 2d 363, 282 P.2d 174
(1955) (misrepresentation about the acreage involved in a sale of property); Martin v. Martin, 110
Cal. App. 2d 228, 242 P.2d 688 (1952) (misrepresentation of intent to provide a fair and just
contract); Lewis v. McClure, 127 Cal. App. 439, 16 P.2d 166 (1932) (misrepresenting the profitabil-
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when the tortfeasor occupies a position of trust or confidence or has
superior knowledge relative to the injured party.67
The drug manufacturer must misrepresent the drug's quality or
safety for. any action to be available.6" In the typical drug misrepresen-
tation case the misrepresentations occur in the manufacturer's adver-
tisements or in the information pamphlets which accompany the
drug.69 A misrepresentation also can occur when the advertisements or
pamphlets contain ambiguous words that give a false impression of
drug safety,70 fail to disclose or actively conceal information on drug
safety,7' or make a false statement about the product.72 Finally, a mis-
representation results when the manufacturer conveys only a portion of
the truth, giving the drug user facts which, though truthful, conceal
other material facts.73
Since the manufacturer has a duty to disclose material facts about
the quality and safety of the drug,74 a misrepresentation occurs when
warnings about possible hazards or use limitations are omitted.75 By
placing a drug on the market the manufacturer implies it is safe for its
intended use.76 If this representation is not tempered by adequate
warnings this implied assurance of safety is actionable.
77
Because the misrepresentation must concern a materialf/ct recovery
ity of a hotel); Benner v. Hooper, 112 Cal. App. 53, 296 P. 660 (1931) (failure to correct injured
party's obvious mistake).
67. Goodman v. Kennedy, 18 Cal. 3d 335, 343-47, 556 P.2d 737, 742-45, 134 Cal. Rptr. 375,
380-83 (1976); Gagne v. Bertran, 43 Cal. 2d 481, 489,275 P.2d 15,21 (1954); Martin v. Martin, 110
Cal. App. 2d 228, 235, 242 P.2d 688, 690 (1952). See generally WITKIN, supra note 5, at §§448-450.
68. Wennerholm v. Stanford Univ. School of Med., 20 Cal. 2d 713, 716, 128 P.2d 522, 524
(1942); Lewis v. Terry, 111 Cal. 39, 42, 43 P. 398, 399 (1896); Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc.,
251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 706-07, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398, 411 (1967).
69. See, eg., 20 Cal. 2d at 717, 128 P.2d at 524; Grinnel v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 274 Cal.
App. 2d 424,431, 79 Cal. Rptr. 369, 372 (1969); Magee v. Wyeth Lab. Inc., 214 Cal. App. 2d 340,
346, 29 Cal. Rptr. 322, 325 (1963).
70. See 214 Cal. App. 2d at 348, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 325.
71. See G.D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. App. 3d 22, 26-27, 122 Cal. Rptr. 218,
221 (1975). See also Malik v. Universal Resources Corp., 425 F. Supp. 350, 364 (S.D.Cal. 1976);
American Trust Co. v. California West. States Life Ins. Co., 15 Cal. 2d 42, 64-5, 98 P.2d 497, 508-
09 (1940).
72. See Simone v. McKee, 142 Cal. App. 2d 307, 312-13, 298 P.2d 667, 671 (1956); Nathan-
son v. Murphy, 132 Cal. App. 2d 363, 366, 282 P.2d 174, 177 (1955).
73. See Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 9 Cal. 3d 51, 65, 507 P.2d 653, 661, 107 Cal. Rptr. 45,
53 (1973). While a misrepresentation was also involved in Sindell v. Abbott Lab., 26 Cal. 3d 588,
607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980), Sindell was pressed upon a product liability claim. Id. at
610-12, 607 P.2d at 936-37, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144-45.
74. See 9 Cal. 3d at 65, 507 P.2d at 661, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 53; Carmichael v. Reitz, 17 Cal.
App. 3d 958, 989, 95 Cal. Rptr. 381, 400 (1971); 214 CaL App. 2d at 351, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 328;
Annot., 76 A.L.R.2d 9, 15 (1961).
75. See Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 697, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398, 405
(1967).
76. Thus, when the manufacturer fails to include a necessary warning about the drug, it
represents that no warning is needed. See 214 Cal. App. 2d at 348, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 326; Lingsch v.
Savage, 213 Cal. App. 2d 729, 736, 29 Cal. Rptr. 201, 205 (1963).
77. G.D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. App. 3d 22, 26-27, 122 Cal. Rptr. 218, 221
(1975).
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generally is denied when the claimed misrepresentation involves state-
ments of opinion.7" Statements of opinion by experts or persons with
superior knowledge, however, can be the basis for a deceit action.79
The manufacturer in the typical drug misrepresentation case is an ex-
pert in the drug field, and its opinion can be treated as fact by the drug
user. 0 Thus, even the manufacturer's statements of opinion regarding
a drug's qualities are actionable misrepresentations."'
An actionable misrepresentation by the manufacturer therefore oc-
curs in the typical case. The inquiry now turns to whether scienter, or
knowledge of the falsity of the statements, is present.
B. Scienter of Drug Manufacturers
The element of scienter82 focuses on whether the defendant knows
the statement is false. Scienter is present when the tortfeasor either
knows the statement is false, should have known the statement is
false,83 or represents a statement as true without having reasonable
grounds to believe the statement is true. 4
In the typical drug misrepresentation case scienter exists when the
facts indicate the manufacturer had information available that either
refuted its claims about drug safety or would have raised reasonable
doubts about the drug's safety.85 Furthermore, since the manufacturer
is held to the highest level of knowledge about its drug, statements
about drug safety made when the manufacturer did not have adequate
information to document its claims demonstrate that scienter exists.
8 6
Once a misrepresentation and scienter have been shown, the inquiry
turns to the question of intent by the manufacturer to induce the in-
jured party to rely on the misrepresentations.
78. See generally WITKIN, supra note 5, at §447; RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, at §538A.
79. Goodman v. Kennedy, 18 Cal. 3d 335, 346, 556 P.2d 737, 745, 134 Cal. Rptr. 375, 383
(1976); Union Flower Mkt. Ltd. v. Southern Cal. Flower Mkt. Ltd., 10 Cal. 2d 671, 676, 76 P.2d
503, 505 (1938); Harazim v. Lynam, 267 Cal. App. 2d 127, 131-32, 72 Cal. Rptr. 670, 671 (1968);
WrrKIN, supra note 5, at §458.
80. See Salmon v. Parke, Davis & Co., 520 F.2d 1359, 1362 (4th Cir. 1975); Henderson v.
National Drug Co., 343 Pa. 601, 605, 23 A.2d 743, 748 (1942).
81. The plaintiff must show the statements are assertions of fact or expert opinion, and not
merely "puffing" or strictly advertising claims. See WITKIN, supra note 5, at §447. Courts, how-
ever, are narrowing the scope of the "puffing" exception and are expanding liability for broad
statements of product quality. See Hauter v. Zogarts, 14 Cal. 3d 104, 112, 534 P.2d 377, 381, 120
Cal. Rptr. 681, 685 (1975) (permitting recovery for manufacturer claim the product was "safe").
82. The element of scienter is important when the injured party seeks recovery for an inten-
tional tort. If a negligent or innocent misrepresentation forms the basis of the action the injured
party does not have to show scienter. PROSSER, supra note 1, at §107.
83. See Benner v. Hooper, 112 Cal. App. 53, 59, 296 P. 660, 662 (1931).
84. Gagne v. Bertram, 43 Cal. 2d 481, 487, 275 P.2d 15, 20 (1954).
85. See notes 83 and 84 and accompanying text supra.
86. See Carmichael v. Reitz, 17 Cal. App. 3d 958, 988, 95 Cal. Rptr. 381, 400 (1971);
McEwen v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 270 Or. 375, 397-400, 528 P.2d 522, 531-32 (1974); An-
not., 76 A.L.R.2d 9 (1961).
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C Intent to Induce Reliance
The tortfeasor is liable only to those persons he or she intends to rely
on the misrepresentation.8" Since the tortfeasor usually knows that per-
sons to whom he or she speaks will rely on the statements, intent to
induce reliance normally is present when the statements are- made di-
rectly to the injured party.88 The intent also can exist when the misrep-
resentation is made to a third person but is likely to reach and be acted
upon by the injured party.89 On the other hand, when the tortfeasor
neither intends nor expects that the misrepresentation would reach the
injured party recovery is denied. 90
In the typical drug misrepresentation case the injured party is not
personally known to the manufacturer, but receives the misrepresenta-
tion through advertisements and pamphlets distributed by the manu-
facturer.9" Even though personal contact between the parties is
lacking, however, intent to induce reliance can exist when the misrepre-
sentation is contained in information distributed to the public by mass
media.
The case of Cohen v. Citizens National Trust & Savings Bank 92 is
often cited for the proposition that the intent to deceive the public ex-
ists when the misrepresentation is included in advertisements intended
for the public.93 In Cohen the defendant illegally modified a house and
sold it without disclosing the illegality.94 The house eventually was
purchased by Cohen, who then discovered the illegal improvements.95
The court found he could not recover for the initial deceit committed
by the defendant since the defendant did not sell the house to Cohen,
did not know Cohen existed, and could not have intended to deceive
him.96 Cohen also could not recover under a public deception theory
since the defendant did not publicize the misrepresentation by the mass
media.97 Dictum in the case, however, subsequently was used in a
number of cases to establish that a tortfeasor intends to induce reliance
by every person who is actually misled when the misrepresentation is
87. See Menefee v. Blitz, 181 Or. 100, 120-21, 179 P.2d 550, 560 (1947). See generally PRos-
SER, supra note 1, at §107; WITHIN, supra note 5, at §467.
88. Nathanson v. Murphy, 132 Cal. App. 2d 363, 368, 282 P.2d 174, 178 (1955); Wice v.
Schilling, 124 Cal. App. 2d 735, 743-44, 269 P.2d 231, 237 (1954).
89. 132 Cal. App. 2d at 368, 282 P.2d at 178; 124 Cal. App. 2d at 743-44, 269 P.2d at 237;
Strutzel v. Williams, 109 Cal. App. 2d 512, 515, 249 P.2d 988, 990 (1952).
90. Cohen v. Citizens Natl Trust & Say., 143 Cal. App. 2d 480, 485, 300 P.2d 14, 17 (1956).
91. See Magee v. Wyeth Lab. Inc., 214 Cal. App. 2d 340, 346, 29 Cal. Rptr. 322, 325 (1963).
92. 143 Cal. App. 2d 480, 300 P.2d 14 (1956).
93. Varwig v. Anderson-Behel Porsche-Audi Co., 74 Cal. App. 3d 580, 581, 141 Cal. Rptr.
539, 540-41 (1977); Block v. Tobin, 45 Cal. App. 3d 214, 219-20, 119 Cal. Rptr. 288, 290 (1975).
94. 143 Cal. App. 2d at 483, 300 P.2d at 16.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 485, 300 P.2d at 17.
97. Id. at 486, 300 P.2d at 18.
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disseminated by advertisements to the mass media. 98 This principle is
also followed in California Civil Code Section 1711. 99 The key to find-
ing intent to induce reliance, therefore, lies in the use of the mass media
to disseminate the misrepresentation. l00
Since the misrepresentation in the typical drug misrepresentation
case is broadcast in advertisements or pamphlets included with the
drug,'' the injured party comes under the Cohen principle. The man-
ufacturer presumably intends to induce the injured party to rely when
the injured party is actually misled by the misrepresentation.
0 2
In the typical drug misrepresentation situation, therefore, a misrepre-
sentation and intent to induce reliance by advertisements may be pres-
ent. The next area for consideration is whether the reliance by the
injured party is justified.
D. Reliance by the Injured Party
The injured party can recover only if he or she has relied justifiably
on the misrepresentation. 0 3 The question of justified reliance, how-
ever, involves two separate inquiries. The injured party must actually
rely on the misrepresentation and the actual reliance must be justified
or reasonable under the circumstances. 104
L Actual Reliance by the Injured Party
The injured party relies on the misrepresentation when he or she
changes position after receiving the misrepresentation. l05 Generally,
the injured party will rely upon a specific misrepresentation. Reliance
98. 74 Cal. App. 3d at 581, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 540; 45 Cal. App. 3d at 219, 119 Cal. Rptr. at
290; Hesse v. Vinatieri, 145 Cal. App. 2d 448, 452-53, 302 P.2d 699, 703 (1956).
99. CAL. CIv. CODE §1711 provides:
One who practices a deceit with intent to defraud the public, or a particular class of
persons, is deemed to have intended to defraud every individual in that class, who is
actually misled by the deceit.
100. See, e.g., 45 Cal. App. 3d at 219, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 290; Gill v. Johnson, 125 Cal. App.
296, 300, 13 P.2d 857, 859 (1932).
101. See notes 69-71 and accompanying text supra.
102. A second theory can also be used to infer intent to induce reliance when misrepresenta-
tions are made to induce the public to buy a product. Wennerholm v. Stanford Univ. School of
Med., 20 Cal. 2d 713, 716, 128 P.2d 522, 524 (1942). The intent exists because the misrepresenta-
tions were intended to cause the injured party to change position. In the typical drug misrepresen-
tation case, however, this second theory would likely be ignored since the Cohen principle would
more directly reach the manufacturer.
If this second approach were adopted by the courts, the manufacturer could rebut the inference
of intent. The logic of the manufacturer's argument is difficult to see, however, as it would claim
that it was not trying to influence the buying habits of the public when it advertised its product.
Since the manufacturer is not likely to invest great sums of money to promote its product if it did
not wish to generate sales, the argument is not convincing.
103. See generally PROSSER, supra note 1, at §108; WITKIN, supra note 5, at §472.
104. See PROSSER, supra note I, at §108; WITK , supra note 5, at §472.
105. Spinks v. Clark, 147 Cal. 439, 444, 82 P. 45, 47 (1905); Hamilton v. French, 78 Cal. App.
289, 292, 248 P. 281, 282-83 (1926).
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also exists when the injured party's action was based upon considera-
tion of the tortfeasor's reputation. °6 In the typical drug misrepresenta-
tion case, reliance is present when the injured party purchases and uses
the drug after learning of the manufacturer's advertisements. 10 7 Such
actual reliance, however, must be justified under the circumstances to
permit recovery.
2. JustYed Reliance by the Injured Party
The injured party can recover only if his actual reliance on the mis-
representation was justified or reasonable.10 8  The injured party must
first have the right to rely on the misrepresentation. This right exists
when he or she is a member of the group the tortfeasor intended to
defraud with the misrepresentation. 1 9 In addition, the injured party
must rely on statements of fact; l"0 reliance on opinions generally is not
justified."' The injured party, however, can justifiably rely upon an
expert's opinion." 2 Additionally, the injured party cannot rely on
statements which are obviously false nor can he or she rely on state-
ments which an independent investigation would have shown were
false.
t'3
In the typical drug misrepresentation case, the injured party is a drug
purchaser or user and falls within the group of persons the manufac-
turer intends to defraud with the advertisements.1 4 The injured party
therefore has the right to rely on the misrepresentation.
Since the manufacturer is an expert on the drug,' '5 the injured party
could rely on a misrepresentation even if it involves a statement of
106. Odell v. Frueh, 146 Cal. App. 2d 504, 510, 304 P.2d 45, 50 (1956). The Odell rule was
originally formulated for product warranty cases under the Uniform Sales Act but continues to be
applicable under current law. CAL. U. COM. CODE §2315, comment 2. But see id., comment 5,
which indicates "the existence of a. . . trade name. . . is only one of the facts to be considered
but it is not of itself decisive on the issue."
107. If the injured party can show reliance upon a series of advertisements, an inference is
raised that he did in fact rely. As a practical matter this will be sufficient because it is virtually
impossible for the manufacturer to rebut the inference when a general advertising campaign is
involved.
108. See PROSSER, supra note I, at §107. But see WITKIN, supra note 5, at §476.
109. See Menefee v. Blitz, 181 Or. 100, 120-21, 179 P.2d 550, 560 (1947); PROSSER, supra note
1, at §107. This element of the tort is directly related to the intent to deceive element. See note 87
and accompanying textsupra. When the tortfeasor does not intend the injured party to rely on the
misrepresentation, therefore, any reliance which the injured party incurred is not justified.
110. See Gagne v. Bertram, 43 Cal. 2d 481,489,275 P.2d 15,21 (1954); Custodio v. Bauer, 251
Cal. App. 2d 303, 314, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 470 (1967).
111. Borba v. Thomas, 70 Cal. App. 3d 144, 152, 138 Cal. Rptr. 565, 570 (1977).
112. Goodman v. Kennedy, 18 Cal. 3d 335, 347, 556 P.2d 737, 746, 134 Cal. Rptr. 375, 383
(1976); Union Flower Mkt. Ltd. v. Southern Cal. Flower Mkt. Ltd., 10 Cal. 2d 671, 676, 76 P.2d
503, 508 (1938); Harazim v. Lynam, 267 Cal. App. 2d 127, 131-32, 72 Cal. Rptr. 670, 671 (1968).
113. Chavez v. Citizens For a Fair Farm Labor Law, 84 Cal. App. 3d 77, 80, 148 Cal. Rptr.
278, 280 (1978); RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, at §541.
114. See notes 91-102 and accompanying text supra.
115. See note 80 and accompanying text supra.
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opinion. 1 6 The information needed to rebut the manufacturer's drug
safety claims likely are unavailable to the injured party." 7 Even if the
information were available to the injured party, however, it often
would be too technical for him or her to understand. Under these cir-
cumstances the injured party would not have to make an independent
investigation before relying on the manufacturer's claims and the reli-
ance would be justified.
The deceit elements of misrepresentation, made with scienter and
with the intent to induce the injured party to rely, and the justified
reliance by the injured party may be present in the typical drug misrep-
resentation case. The last element to be discussed in the typical case
involves damages to the injured party caused by the misrepresentation.
E Damages to the Injured Party
The misrepresentation must cause damage to the injured party
before courts will grant recovery."18 Although the tort of deceit is pri-
marily used when the injured party has suffered economic losses, the
action also is available when physical injuries have been sustained." 9
The misrepresentation will cause the damages if the injuries would
not have occurred "but for" the misrepresentation' 20 or, alternatively,
if the misrepresentation was a substantial factor in causing the inju-
ries."' In the typical drug manufacturer case, the injuries can be di-
rectly traced to the drug.' 22 Thus, if the injured party would not have
taken the drug but for the manufacturer's misrepresentation, the mis-
representation caused the injury.
123
116. See note 112 and accompanying text supra.
117. See Sindell v. Abbott Lab., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 594, 607 P.2d 924, 925-26, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132,
133 (1980); Dowie & Marshall, The Bendectin Cover-Up, MOTHER JONES, November, 1980, at 42.
118. Realty Co. of Amer. v. Burton, 160 Cal. App. 2d 178, 196, 325 P.2d 171, 182 (1958)
(plaintiff injured when defendant entered into a second contract to sell property from plaintiff's
development without plaintiffs consent or knowledge); Machado v. Machado, 66 Cal. App. 2d
401, 405, 152 P.2d 457, 459 (1944) (plaintiff claimed a fraud on land ownership but since plaintiff
received his rightful property interest no injury occurred); Krauss v. Strop, 47 Cal. App. 2d 452,
455, 118 P.2d 332, 334 (1941) (plaintiff damaged when defendant executor gave credit to estate for
an amount decedent owed to plaintiff before distributing to plaintiff his share of the estate); Mid-
dleton v. J.M.A. Const. Co., 47 A.D.2d 544, 546, 363 N.Y.S.2d 100, 101 (1975) (no damage suf-
fered by plaintiff since banks did not foreclose on the building loan the plaintiff claimed was
fraudulently procured).
Courts generally require that the injured party suffer a substantial or pecuniary loss. 422 W.
15th St. v. Estate of Johnson, 258 A.D. 227, 228, 16 N.Y.S.2d 283, 284 (1939). Some courts, how-
ever, will permit recovery when only nominal damages are incurred. Cooke v. Colman, 150 Misc.
294, 295, 269 N.Y.S. 21, 23 (1934); Ziegler v. Stinson, 111 Or. 243, 255, 224 P. 641, 645 (1924).
119. See note 5 and accompanying text supra. See also Hoar v. Rasmussen, 229 Wis. 509, 511,
282 N.W. 652, 654 (1938).
120. HARPER & JAMES, supra note 4, at §7.13.
121. Wennerholm v. Stanford Univ. School of Med., 20 Cal. 2d 713, 717, 128 P.2d 522, 524
(1942).
122. See note 7 supra.
123. The drug manufacturer is not an insurer of the quality of the drug, but need only provide
1981 / Prenatal Fraud
In summary, an action for deceit usually will be available whenever
a drug manufacturer misrepresents the qualities of a drug. A misrepre-
sentation by the drug manufacturer, scienter, intent of the manufac-
turer to induce the injured party to rely, the injured party's justified
reliance on the misrepresentation, and damages are all present.
The next inquiry will consider whether the tort elements are present
in a prenatal fraud action. The focus of the comment will move from
the typical drug manufacturer case to the specific fact situation sur-
rounding a prenatal fraud, involving a prescription drug used by an
expectant mother and a child born with an injury caused by the
drug.' 4 Since the manufacturer cannot communicate with the fetus
and the fetus cannot rely directly on the misrepresentation, the prenatal
fraud action necessarily involves use of theories which permit recovery
for indirect deceit.
RECOVERY FOR INDIRECT DECEIT
While a prenatal fraud action differs in important respects from the
typical drug misrepresentation case, the two actions are similar in a
number of areas. A misrepresentation of a material fact about the
drug's safety arises in the same manner in a prenatal fraud action as in
the typical drug misrepresentation case. The manufacturer would ei-
ther misstate or omit a material fact and then disseminate the misrepre-
sentation by advertisement. Scienter also will be present in the
prenatal fraud case since the manufacturer's knowledge of the falsity of
the statement is not dependent upon the drug user. Finally, since the
injuries the prenatal fraud plaintiff suffers can be directly traced to the
drug, the damages element in a prenatal fraud action is the same as for
the typical drug misrepresentation case.
The prenatal fraud action differs, however, in several significant as-
pects from the typical drug misrepresentation. The manufacturer di-
rects the misrepresentation toward the attending physician and to the
expectant mother, but does not direct the misrepresentation to thefetus.
In addition, the fetus cannot purchase the drug, nor does the fetus read
a reasonably safe product. See Carmichael v. Reitz, 17 Cal. App. 3d 958, 988, 95 Cal. Rptr. 381,
400 (1971). The manufacturer is liable for only those results which it could have reasonably fore-
seen. Magee v. Wyeth Lab. Inc., 214 Cal. App. 2d 340, 350, 29 Cal. Rptr. 322, 329-30 (1963). The
injured party thus must suffer a foreseeable injury and recovery will be denied if he has a unique
susceptibility or condition. Christofferson v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 15 Cal. App. 3d 75, 79, 92 Cal.
Rptr. 825, 827 (1971).
124. The prenatal fraud case involves a prescription drug since that poses the most difficult
test for the plaintiff. The prenatal fraud plaintiff must develop a chain linking the fetus to the
attending physicial since misrepresentations involving prescription drugs are directed toward the
physician and not to the general public. See Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 9 Cal. 3d 51, 65, 507
P.2d 653, 661, 107 Cal. Rptr. 45, 53 (1973); Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d
689, 707, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398, 411 (1967); 214 Cal. App. 2d at 350, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 328.
Pacific Law Journal / VoL 13
or hear the misrepresentation. In the prenatal fraud case, therefore, the
major difficulties lie in finding the manufacturer intended to induce the
fetus to rely and in showing that the fetus relied justifiably on the mis-
representation.
This section will evaluate cases that have permitted recovery for de-
ceit when the tortfeasor did not make the misrepresentations directly to
the injured party,'25 or when the injured party did not directly rely on
the misrepresentations.' 26 The legal principles derived from these cases
will be analyzed to determine how they apply to the prenatal fraud
situation. The first inquiry looks at situations when liability was im-
posed upon the tortfeasor even though the misrepresentation was not
directly communicated to the injured party. These cases will determine
whether the manufacturer can intend to induce the fetus to rely in a
prenatal fraud action.
A. Intent to Induce Reliance by Indirect Misrepresentations
The prenatal fraud plaintiff can use three theories to infer that the
manufacturer intends to induce the fetus to rely on the misrepresenta-
tion.127 The manufacturer can intend to defraud the fetus when the
misrepresentations are included in advertisements distributed to the
public.' 28 Under the second theory the intent to induce fetal reliance
would exist when the initial misrepresentation is made to the attending
physician with the knowledge that it would be recommunicated to the
patient.' 29 Finally, by directing the misrepresentation at the fetus'
known representative the manufacturer intends to influence the fe-
tus.' 30 While each theory can be used to infer manufacturer intent to
induce fetal reliance, each theory also has limitations which affect its
applicability in a prenatal fraud case.' 3' The possibilities and limita-
tions of each theory will be fully discussed.
125. See notes 125-214 and accompanying text infra.
126. See notes 215-235 and accompanying text infra.
127. See Walters v. Marler, 83 Cal. App. 3d 1, 19, 147 Cal. Rptr. 655, 666 (1978); Cohen v.
Citizens Nat'l Trust & Say., 143 Cal. App. 2d 480, 486, 300 P.2d 14, 18 (1956); PROSSER, upra
note 1, at §107; WIruN, supra note 5, at §467. The three theories are essentially extensions of the
general principle that the tortfeasor is liable only to those persons to whom the misrepresentation
was directed. See note 87 and accompanying text supra.
128. The "public" to whom the misrepresentation is directed includes any person within a
general group or class of individuals. See notes 132-141 and accompanying text infra.
129. The physician will be treating both the expectant mother and the fetus and both will be a
"patient" under this theory. See notes 140-141 and accompanying text infra.
130. A child, and also a fetus, can have a representative acting on his or her behalf, even
though the child cannot formally appoint an agent. See notes 181-195 and accompanying text
infra.
131. See note 30 supra.
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1. Misrepresentations Made to the Public
A manufacturer intends to induce reliance by the public when the
misrepresentation is contained in advertisements and distributed by the
mass media. 132 This principle was discussed earlier in connection with
the typical drug misrepresentation situation and applies equally well to
the prenatal fraud situation. 33 The manufacturer thus intends to in-
duce the fetus to rely on the misrepresentation if the fetus is within the
group to whom the misrepresentation was targeted.'
34
The manufacturer has a duty to disclose to the medical profession
the known hazards associated with the drug. 135 When the quality of
the drug is misrepresented, the manufacturer violates its duty of disclo-
sure. 136 The attending physician is within the target group for the mis-
representation. The manufacturer's duty to disclose, however, actually
is intended for the benefit of the patient. 13  The manufacturer must
also warn the patient when adequate warnings cannot be given the
physician or when the physician cannot make an individualized judg-
ment about the risks associated with the drug for a particular patient.
38
A warning that misstates or omits vital information about the drug's
safety cannot be regarded as adequate. The manufacturer has not
given proper warning to the physician and the manufacturer must pro-
vide an adequate warning to the patient. By failing to correct the mis-
representation and give proper warnings to the patient, the
manufacturer intends to induce the patient to rely on the misrepresen-
tation. Since the physician in the prenatal fraud case is treating both
the expectant mother and the fetus, the manufacturer arguably intends
132. See notes 87-102 and accompanying text supra.
133. The prenatal fraud situation can be viewed differently from the typical drug misrepresen-
tation case since the misrepresentations will be contained in advertisements directed to the medi-
cal profession. See, e.g., Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 9 Cal. 3d 51, 507 P.2d 653, 107 Cal. Rptr.
45 (1973); Wennerholm v. Stanford Univ. School of Med., 20 Cal. 2d 713, 128 P.2d 521 (1942).
The physician must make the initial decision on the use of the drug and the courts consider that
the physician is the drug consumer. See, e.g., 9 Cal. 3d at 65, 507 P.2d at 661, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 53;
Carmichael v. Reitz, 17 Cal. App. 3d 958, 989, 95 Cal. Rptr. 381, 401 (1971); Magee v. Wyeth
Lab., Inc., 214 Cal. App. 2d 340, 352, 29 Cal. Rptr. 322, 328 (1963); Hamilton v. Hardy, 549 P.2d
1099, 1110 (Colo. App. 1976).
134. See note 87 and accompanying text supra. The misrepresentation arguably is directed
toward any user of the drug, and on this basis the manufacturer can initially be seen to try to
influence the fetal use of its drug. The theory will reach every person whom the manufacturer
intends to induce reliance, and who in fact relies, on the misrepresentation. See 20 Cal. 2d at 716,
128 P.2d at 524.
135. The manufacturer is under an affirmative duty to disclose known hazards associated with
its drug. See 17 Cal. App. 3d at 989, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 400; 214 Cal. App. 2d at 352,29 Cal. Rptr. at
328. While the duty requires disclosure of the hazards to the medical profession, the warning is
for the benefit of the patient. 549 P.2d at I110 (Colo. App. 1976).
136. See 9 Cal. 3d at 65, 507 P.2d at 661, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 53; 17 Cal. App. 3d at 989, 95 Cal.
Rptr. at 400.
137. 549 P.2d at 1110.
138. See 9 Cal. 3d at 65, 507 P.2d at 661, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 53; 17 Cal. App. 3d at 989, 95 Cal.
Rptr. at 400.
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to induce the fetus to rely.' 39
This theory will reach both the expectant mother and the fetus, as the
physician's patients. The theory, however, requires that the fetus actu-
ally rely upon the misrepresentation for the intent by the tortfeasor to
be present.' 40 The question of third party reliance is critical here, but it
will be treated later in this comment.'
4 '
The manufacturer can intend the physician's patient to rely on the
misrepresentation under a second theory. This approach involves
statements made to a third person but which are to be recommunicated
to the injured party.
2 Misrepresentation Communicated Through a Third Person
Liability for deceit has been imposed in a number of cases when the
misrepresentation reached the injured party indirectly. 42 In the lead-
ing case of Crystal Pier Amusement Park v. Cannan,43 the defendant
made a misrepresentation to a third person, intending that the plaintiff
would act upon the statements.'" Since the defendant knew the plain-
tiff would receive and act upon the misrepresentation, the defendant
intended to induce the plaintiff to rely.' 45 A tortfeasor intends to in-
139. This theory reaches both the expectant mother and the fetus as the patients of the physi-
cian. The fetus cannot actually rely on the misrepresentation, however, and must use the reliance
of another person to maintain a cause of action. See notes 140-141 and 215-235 and accompany-
ing text infra.
The theory also establishes the boundaries of the target group by the persons the duty to dis-
close information is owed. Is this a realistic approach since the advertisements are limited to the
medical profession?
The physician must be convinced the drug is safe before prescribing it. The physician is the
party capable of evaluating the risks associated with the drug. In such circumstances the physi-
cian properly is the drug consumer. 17 Cal. App. 3d at 989, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 401. The manufac-
turer's liability could be limited to the medical profession. Finally, since the duty to warn of
hazards associated with the drug has been raised m product liability and warranty cases, see, e.g.,
Lewis v. Terry, 111 Cal. 39, 43 P. 398 (1896); 17 Cal. App. 3d 958, 95 Cal. Rptr. 38 1, the rationale
may be inappropriate for deceit claims.
Courts have recognized, however, that even material which is given limited circulation can
reach the public. When this occurs the patient is granted recovery. Wennerholm v. Stanford
Univ. School of Med., 20 Cal. 2d 713, 128 P.2d 522 (1942).
The argument that the duty to warn is limited to product liability cases is similarly not convinc-
ing. The important factor in a deceit element is that the tortfeasor has a duty to disclose the
information. The source of the duty is not relevant.
The manufacturer intends to defraud all the persons to whom it owes a duty of disclosure when
it suppresses or misstates the information. The target group thus can appropriately be ascertained
by those persons to whom the duty to disclose is owed.
140. See, e.g., 20 Cal. 2d at 717, 128 P.2d at 529; Cohen v. Citizens Nat'l Trust & Say., 143
Cal. App. 2d 480, 486, 300 P.2d 14, 18 (1956).
141. See notes 215-235 and accompanying text infra.
142. See, e.g., E.M. Fleischmarm Lumber Corp. v. Resources Corp. Int'l., 105 F. Supp. 681 (D.
Del. 1952); Massei v. Lettunich, 248 Cal. App. 2d 68, 56 Cal. Rptr. 232 (1967); Nathanson v.
Murphy, 132 Cal. App. 2d 363, 282 P.2d 174 (1955); Strutzel v. Williams, 109 Cal. App. 2d 512,
240 P.2d 988 (1952).
143. 219 Cal. 184, 25 P.2d 839 (1933).
144. Id. at 187, 25 P.2d at 841.
145. Id. at 187-88, 25 P.2d at 841.
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duce the injured party's reliance when the misrepresentation is made to
a third person and the tortfeasor intends or knows the misrepresenta-
tion will reach the injured party.'46 This principle also is applicable for
misrepresentations involving a nondisclosure of facts the tortfeasor has
a duty to disclose.
147
Before intent to induce reliance is inferred, however, the facts and
circumstances must establish the tortfeasor knows the misrepresenta-
tion will reach the injured party. 148 For example, in Nathanson v. Mur-
phy 14 9 the defendant made a misrepresentation to a third person while
standing in the presence of the plaintiff' 50 Under the circumstances
the defendant knew that the plaintiff would act upon the statement if
the third person did not.' 5' This knowledge was sufficient to find intent
to induce reliance.'
52
When the injured party learns of the misrepresentation from a third
party the courts look to the relationship between the third person and
the injured party to see if the tortfeasor should have known the misrep-
resentation would be repeated."' The requisite degree of certainty ex-
ists when the third person occupies such a position of trust with the
injured party that the third party would be expected to communicate
the information to the injured party. 154 The Crystal Pier principle ap-
plies even when the third party is not under a duty to report to the
injured party.'
55
Since the prenatal fraud action involves an intentional tort'56 the
facts and circumstances must give the manufacturer special reason to
expect the misrepresentation will be repeated before the Crystal Pier
principle will apply.' 57 The type of drug involved in the case then is
146. See, e.g., 132 Cal. App. 2d at 368, 282 P.2d at 178; Wice v. Schilling, 124 Cal. App. 2d
735, 745-46, 269 P.2d 231, 237 (1954).
147. 248 Cal. App. 2d at 73, 56 Cal. Rptr. at 235.
.148. Prosser, Misrepresentation and Third Persons, 19 VAND. L. REv. 231, 239 (1966) [herein-
after cited as Misrepresentation].
149. 132 Cal. App. 2d 363, 282 P.2d 174 (1955).
150. Id. at 368, 282 P.2d at 178.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. See Misrepresentation, supra note 148, at 254.
154. See, e.g., E.M. Fleischmann Lumber Corp. v. Resources Corp. Int'l, 105 F. Supp. 681 (D.
Del. 1952); Varwig v. Anderson-Behel Porsche-Audi Co., 74 Cal. App. 3d 580, 581, 141 Cal. Rptr.
539, 540-41 (1977); Strutzel v. Williams, 109 Cal. App. 2d 512, 515, 240 P.2d 988, 990 (1952);
Quirici v. Freeman, 98 Cal. App. 2d 194, 200-02, 219 P.2d 897, 901-02 (1950).
155. See 98 Cal. App. 2d at 200-02, 219 P.2d at 900-01. In Quirici the plaintiffpurchased paint
which the defendant had manufactured. Id. at 197, 219 P.2d at 899. The manufacturer failed to
disclose the paint specifications and the plaintiff purchased the paint after discussions with the
store personnel. Id. An actionable fraud occurred when the store personnel recommunicated the
manufacturer's misrepresentations about the paint since the plaintiff could be expected to rely
upon the salesperson's statements about the paint. Id. at 200-02, 219 P.2d at 901-02.
156. See note 12 supra.
157. Misrepresentation, supra note 148, at 254.
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critical to the prenatal fraud action. Because virtually any drug could
be given to a pregnant woman, the manufacturer couldforesee the mis-
representation about a drug would be repeated to an expectant
mother. 158 The mere foreseeability that the misrepresentation would
be repeated, however, is not sufficient.' 59 Only when the misrepresen-
tation involves a drug primarily or solely intended for use by pregnant
women does the manufacturer have special reason to expect the mis-
representation would be restated to an expectant mother.' 60 Since the
expectant mother is seeking medical treatment for herself and the fetus
she would be concerned about any medication she takes. In addition,
the physician is under an affirmative duty to inform the patient of the
potential hazards associated with the proposed treatment.' 6' Under
these circumstances, the physician can be expected to describe to the
expectant mother the qualities and effects of the drug and recommuni-
cate the manufacturer's misrepresentations. 62  The manufacturer
therefore intends to induce the expectant mother to rely on the misrep-
resentation.
The Crystal Pier principle cannot be extended to cover the fetus since
the physician cannot communicate with it. Although this principle
does not directly reach the fetus, this is not fatal to a prenatal fraud
cause of action. The theory permits the prenatal fraud plaintiff to show
that the drug manufacturer intended to induce the expectant mother to
rely on the misrepresentation. At the time of the misrepresentation she
was acting in a representative capacity on behalf of the fetus.' 63 The
158. Similar to the fact situation in Quirici, see note 155 supra, the expectant mother would be
relying upon the experience and knowledge of the physician, and any communication about the
drug's qualities between the expectant mother and the physician would likely include a restate-
ment of the manufacturer's misrepresentations of the drug.
159. This emphasizes the distinction between intentional and negligent deceit actions. In in-
tentional deceit actions, the tortfeasor must not only foresee that the misrepresentation will be
recommunicated, but must have even greater certainty that the misrepresentation will reach the
injured party. Misrepresentation, supra note 148, at 254.
160. This distinction would apply only when the prenatal fraud plaintiff used the Crystal Pier
principle. If the Cohen principle, see notes 92-102 and accompanying text supra, or the agency
principle, see notes 167-214 and accompanying text infra, are used, the misrepresentation does not
have to be concerning a drug for pregnant women. The limitations about foreseeable injuries,
however, would still apply. See notes 120-121 supra.
161. This forms the basic premise behind the doctrine of informed consent. The physician
must provide the patient sufficient information to permit thepatient to make a reasoned judgment
about the treatment.
162. The physician conceivably would not detail the drug's qualities to the expectant mother.
If the physician did not relay the misrepresentation to the expectant mother there would be no
actionable fraud. The prenatal fraud situation, however, requires that the physician and the ex-
pectant mother occupy a physician-patient relationship. The physician is thus under an affirma-
tive duty to inform the patient of the safety of the proposed treatment. Under these circumstances,
the Crystal Pier principle would apply to find the manufacturer intended to induce the expectant
mother to rely. This, however, does not show that the expectant mother did, in fact, rely upon the
misrepresentation.
163. The expectant mother can be viewed as a person authorized to represent the fetus in
securing medical treatment. See notes 183-184 and accompanying text infra. This representa-
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Crystal Pier approach therefore must be used in conjunction with es-
tablished agency principles to show that the manufacturer intended to
indirectly induce the fetus to rely. This theory will now be explored.
Under the last approach for finding manufacturer intent to induce
fetal reliance, misrepresentations made to an injured party's known
representative are actually directed toward the injured party. This the-
ory is based upon agency principles and is different from the Crystal
Pier approach. The third theory represents the best support for finding
that the prenatal fraud plaintiff can satisfy the intent to induce reliance
element of the tort. Under the third theory the principal can acquire a
deceit action without having heard the misrepresentation if the state-
ment was directed to his or her agent. 164 In contrast, Crystal Pier ap-
plies when the third party recommunicating the misrepresentation is
not an agent of the injured party. The injured party under Crystal Pier,
however, must actually learn of the misrepresentation and rely upon
it. 165
3. Misrepresentations Directed Toward a Representative Party
The final theory under which a manufacturer can intend to induce
fetal reliance focuses on misrepresentations made to an injured party's
representative. The primary problem facing the prenatal fraud plaintiff
lies in establishing the necessary representative relationships between
the fetus and the attending physician or the expectant mother. Al-
though a fetus cannot personally contract with a person and create an
agency relationship, the fetus can have another person act on its behalf,
and such representative relationships can be recognized to protect the
interests of the fetus. Representative relationships can exist between
the fetus and the attending physician or the expectant mother. Once
the relationships are recognized the intent to induce fetal reliance be-
comes apparent.
When a misrepresentation is directed toward an agent, the principal
can recover for the resulting injury although the misrepresentation
never was repeated to him or her.' 66 Since the agent was representing
tional relationship can exist without formal court order. See notes 190-195 and accompanying text
infra. Thus, the fact that a fetus cannot contract or appoint an agent, see notes 180-182 and
accompanying text infra, is not fatal to a prenatal fraud action.
164. See Grinnell v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 274 Cal. App. 2d 424, 441, 79 Cal. Rptr. 369, 378
(1969); Lewis v. McClure, 127 Cal. App. 439, 448, 16 P.2d 166, 170 (1932).
165. See Crystal Pier Amusement Park v. Cannan, 219 Cal. 184, 188, 25 P.2d 839, 841 (1933);
Varwig v. Anderson-Behel Porsche-Audi Co., 74 Cal. App. 3d 580, 581, 141 Cal. Rptr. 539, 540
(1977).
166. See, e.g. Roberts v. Salot, 166 Cal. App. 2d 294, 333 P.2d 232 (1958); Lewis v. McClure,
127 Cal. App. 439, 16 P.2d 166 (1932); Gammon v. Ealey and Thompson, 97 Cal. App. 452, 275 P.
1005 (1929).
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the principal's interests when the misrepresentation was made, the
tortfeasor actually intended to influence the principal.1
67
This doctrine was applied in the case of Lewis v. McClure. 68 The
plaintiff and her husband purchased a hotel from the defendant after
he had given them inaccurate and misleading information about the
hotel business.'69 Although the husband conducted the negotiations
and only he heard the misrepresentation, the court permitted the wife
to recover because the husband was acting as her agent. 170 The court in
Gammon v. Ealey and Thompson 17 1 also permitted the principal to re-
cover for a fraud directed to the agent. The plaintiff and defendant
were negotiating an exchange of properties. When the plaintiff's and
defendant's agents went to investigate the defendant's land, the defend-
ant's agent misrepresented the quality and productivity of the land the
plaintiff was to receive. 172 After the exchange was made, the plaintiff
discovered the fraud committed upon his agent. 73 The court permitted
the plaintiff to recover for the fraud perpetrated upon his agent.' 74
Under recognized agency principles, an agent represents the princi-
pal in authorized transactions and the agent can affect the legal inter-
ests of the principal. 17  Persons dealing with the agent are actually
dealing with the principal. When a tortfeasor directs a misrepresenta-
tion to an agent, therefore, he or she intends to defraud the principal. 7 6
Since the physician-patient relationship is both a consensual and
fiduciary situation, it has been characterized as an agency relation-
ship. 17 7 The patient places trust in the judgment and ability of the phy-
sician, while the physician has an obligation to act in the best interests
of the patient. 178 Because of the close parallel between the physician-
patient relationship and an agency relationship, courts have used the
167. 166 Cal. App. 2d at 300, 333 P.2d at 236.
168. 127 Cal. App. 439, 16 P.2d 166 (1932).
169. Id. at 448, 16 P.2d at 170.
170. Id.
171. 97 Cal. App. 452, 275 P. 1005 (1929).
172. Id. at 458-59, 275 P. at 1008-09.
173. Id. at 459, 275 P. at 1009.
174. Id.
175. See CAL. CIV. CODE §2330; General Cas. Co. of America v. Azteca Films, Inc., 278 F.2d
161, 166 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 863 (1960) (possession by an agent constitutes actual
possession by the principal); Service v. Bedros, 180 Cal. 519, 521-22, 182 P. 26, 27 (1919) (prior
owners were agents of subsequent owners who could sue to enforce contract made by the agent);
Northern Calif. Dist. Council of Hod Carriers v. Pennsylvania Pipeline, Inc., 103 Cal. App. 3d
163, 172, 162 Cal. Rptr. 851, 856 (1980) (the principal is bound by the authorized acts of the
agent).
176. Since the agent is representing the principal when the misrepresentation occurs, a number
of courts hold the misrepresentation is made directly to the principal. See Annot., 91 A.L.R. 1363
(1934).
177. See Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967).
178. See Stafford v. Shultz, 42 Cal. 2d 767, 777, 270 P.2d 1, 7 (1954); W ohlgemuth v. Meyer,
139 Cal. App. 2d 326, 331, 293 P.2d 816, 820 (1956).
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theories governing a misrepresentation to an agent to permit patients to
recover for misrepresentations directed at their physicians. 79 Thus,
when a drug manufacturer misrepresents a drug's safety to a physician,
the manufacturer intends to induce the patient, as the physician's prin-
cipal, to rely on the misrepresentation.
The physician-patient relationship is consensual in nature 180 and re-
quires both parties to have the capacity to contract. Both a child and
fetus, however, are incapable of entering into a contract. 18  A child
therefore cannot have an agent'8 2 and this prohibition applies equally
to the fetus. Because the fetus cannot enter into a contract, the physi-
cian-patient relationship arguably cannot exist between the physician
and the fetus.
The physician-patient relationship can be established, however,
without a formal contractual agreement between the parties. For ex-
ample, the relationship exists when the physician contracts with a third
party to provide services to the patient. 83 Courts also recognize that
parents can contract with physicians for medical services for the
child. 18 4 Similarly, the expectant mother can contract with the physi-
cian to care for the fetus. During the prenatal period of health care the
physician would be treating both the expectant mother and the fetus.
In a very real sense the expectant mother is contracting for the physi-
cian to care for the development of the fetus when she visits her physi-
cian for prenatal care. Thus, the fact that the fetus is incapable of
entering into a contract does not prevent establishment of the physi-
cian-patient relationship between the physician and the fetus.
The physician can be an agent for the injured party absent a formal
physician-patient relationship. In Grinnell v. Charles Pfizer & Com-
pany'85 the plaintiff was inoculated against polio during a medical
campaign involving mass public inoculations. The local medical asso-
ciation publicized the program and its members administered the vac-
179. 251 Cal. App. 2d at 707, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 411.
180. Agnew v. Parks, 172 Cal. App. 2d 756, 764, 343 P.2d 118, 123 (1959); McNamara v.
Emmons, 36 Cal. App. 2d 199, 204, 97 P.2d 503, 507 (1939).
181. See Johnston v. Southern Pac. Co., 150 Cal. 535, 538, 89 P. 348, 350 (1907); Sparks v.
Sparks, 101 Cal. App. 2d 129, 137, 255 P.2d 238, 243 (1950). Courts recognize a child can make
enforceable contracts for "necessa.ies" even though otherwise incapable of contracting. See Mor-
gan v. Morgan, 220 Cal. App. 2d 665, 679, 34 Cal. Rptr. 82, 89-90 (1963). While medical services
qualify as a necessary item, courts still require the parent to affirm the contract. Ballard v. Ander-
son, 4 Cal. 3d 873, 878, 484 P.2d 1345, 1348, 95 Cal. Rptr. 1, 4 (1971).
182. See Schram v. Poole, 111 F.2d 725, 727 (9th Cir. 1940); 220 Cal. App. 2d at 669, 34 Cal.
Rptr. at 86; CAL. Civ. CODE §33.
183. Zumwalt v. Schwarz, 112 Cal. App. 734, 736-37, 297 P. 608, 609-10 (1931); Scott v. Monte
Cristo Oil & Dev. Co., 15 Cal. App. 453, 458, 115 P. 64, 66 (1911).
184. See 4 Cal. 3d at 878, 484 P.2d at 1348, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 4; Simoneau v. Pacific Elec. Ry.
Co., 159 Cal. 494, 506, 115 P. 320, 326 (1911).
185. 274 Cal. App. 2d 424, 79 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1969).
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cine. 186 The plaintiff later contracted polio from the vaccine and
sought to recover for his injuries. 1 87 Although no formal physician-
patient relationship existed between either the plaintiff and the spon-
soring medical group or the plaintiff and the physician who adminis-
tered the drug, the association was deemed to be the plaintiff's agent.,',
The agency relationship was recognized because the plaintiff placed his
trust in the medical association and the association was acting to fur-
ther the plaintiff's interests in the program.'8 9 In the prenatal fraud
case the fetus is also in a vulnerable position and the attending physi-
cian must act to further the development of the fetus. The Grinnell
rationale would find that the expectant mother is the fetus' representa-
tive when acting to provide treatment for the fetus.
A representative relationship can exist between the attending physi-
cian and the fetus. The expectant mother therefore can contract with
the physician to provide medical services for the fetus. The relation-
ship also can occur under the Grinnell rationale.
The physician-patient relationship has a close parallel in the guard-
ian-ward situation. 90 Guardianship is imposed when the ward is inca-
pable of protecting his or her own interests. 9 The relationship
involves trust and confidence between the parties, and imposes a fiduci-
ary obligation on the guardian to act only in the furtherance of the
ward's interests.' 92 Since the relationship does not flow from consent
by the parties but is predicated upon the need of the ward, the parents
are considered the natural guardians of the child.' 93
186. Id. at 431, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 372-73.
187. Id. at 426, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 370.
188. Id. at 441, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 378.
189. Id.
190. Compare Stafford v. Schultz, 42 Cal. 2d 767, 777, 270 P.2d 1,7 (1954) and Bowman v.
McPheeters, 77 Cal. App. 2d 795, 800, 176 P.2d 745, 748 (1947) with Lerner v. Superior Court, 38
Cal. 2d 676, 681, 242 P.2d 321, 323 (1952) and Guardianship of Carlon, 43 Cal. App. 2d 204, 208-
09, 110 P.2d 488, 490 (1941).
191. Oyama v. State of California, 332 U.S. 633, 643-44 (1948). An important concept under-
lying the entire area of guardianship relations stems from the court's concern for the well-being of
the child. This concern expresses itself in the concept ofparenspatriae and is further emphasized
by statements indicating courts will not permit a child to be prejudiced by his own acts. See, e.g.,
Johnston v. Southern Pac. Co., 150 Cal. 535, 538, 89 P. 348, 350 (1907); Sparks v. Sparks, 101 Cal.
App. 2d 129, 137, 225 P.2d 238, 243 (1950).
192. See Webster v. State Mutual, 50 F. Supp. 11, 15-16 (C.D. Cal.), mod 148 F.2d 315 (9th
Cir. 1943); Estate of Lacy, 54 Cal. App. 3d 172, 184-85, 126 Cal. Rptr. 432, 440-41 (1975); 38 Cal.
App. 2d at 681, 242 P.2d at 323.
193. State v. Superior Court, 86 Cal. App. 3d 475, 482, 150 Cal. Rptr. 308, 313 (1978); In re
White, 54 Cal. App. 2d 637, 640, 129 P.2d 706, 708 (1942). But see Watkins v. Clemmer, 129 Cal.
App. 567, 574, 19 P.2d 303, 307 (1933) (parenthood does not automatically make the parent the
child's guardian). Absent this unique situation between the parent and child, guardianship re-
quires formal court approval. See generall, CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 1400-1411, 1440, 1460.
The statutory procedure for appointing a guardian has a counterpart in the appointment of a
conservator. Id. at §§1800-1812. Unlike a guardianship which can end upon the gaining of ma-
jority of the child, the conservatorship must continue until either the death of the conservatee or
the issuance of a court order. Id at §1860(a). Since a conservatorship is reserved for a proceeding
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A fetus' interests also can be protected by a guardianship.'94 The
fetus is incapable of independent action and must depend entirely upon
the expectant mother. The expectant mother must provide the neces-
sary protection, nourishment, and medical attention for the fetus to sur-
vive. The expectant mother thus occupies a relationship to the fetus
analogous to the relationship a parent has to a child.' 95 Since the par-
ents are the natural guardians of the child the expectant mother occu-
pies a similar guardianship relationship to the fetus.
When a guardian is acting in the ward's interest and is defrauded,
the ward has a cause of action for the misrepresentation. In Stuart v.
Halsey, Stuart & Company'96 the defendant misrepresented the suita-
bility of investments that the guardian was making for the plaintiff.197
The misrepresentation directed toward the guardian was actionable by
the ward. 198 The court implicitly viewed the misrepresentation to the
guardian to be a direct misrepresentation to the ward.199 The defend-
ant thus intended to induce the ward's reliance on the misrepresenta-
tion. The court also granted a child's action for recovery for a
misrepresentation directed toward the parent in Rainer v. Community
MemorialHospital.°" Mary Rainer was a minor when she was under
the defendant's care. The defendant misrepresented to the mother the
need and the advisability of surgery for Mary and secured her consent
for the operation.20 In permitting Mary to seek recovery for damages
resulting from the operation the court found the misrepresentation
made to the parent was actionable by the child.202
In the prenatal fraud case the manufacturer intends to induce the
expectant mother to rely upon the misrepresentations. Since she is act-
ing as the fetus' guardian when she seeks medical treatment the manu-
facturer actually intends to induce fetal reliance.
Finally, the guardian can hire an agent to protect the ward's inter-
ests.203 If the guardian's agent is defrauded while performing his or her
involving an adult, or a minor whose marriage has been dissolved, Id. at §1800, this comment
does not investigate a conservatorship.
194. Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 423, 201 A.2d 537, 538
(1964).
195. See In re Marriage of O'Connell, 80 Cal. App. 3d 849, 858, 146 Cal. Rptr. 26, 32 (1978);
Hills v. Hills, 245 Cal. App. 2d 578, 580,54 Cal. Rptr. 89, 90 (1966); In re Carboni, 46 Cal. App.
2d 605, 613, 116 P.2d 453, 457 (1941); In re Keck, 100 Cal. App. 513, 514, 280 P. 387 (1929).
196. 77 F.2d 812 (1st Cir. 1935).
197. Id. at 813.
198. Id. at 816.
199. Id.
200. 18 Cal. App. 3d 240, 95 Cal. Rptr. 901 (1971).
201. Id. at 251-52, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 907.
202. Id. at 255, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 910.
203. Taylor v. Hill, 115 Cal. 143, 149-50, 44 P. 336, 337-38 (1896).
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duties, the guardian acquires a cause of action.2z° Nevertheless, the
agent was working to further the ward's interests when the misrepre-
sentation occurred.0 5 Since a misrepresentation to an agent is made to
the principal, °6 the guardian, as the agent's principal, acquires a cause
of action. Misrepresentations made to a guardian, however, are also
actionable by the ward.20 7 The misrepresentation to the physician thus
reaches the ward.
In the prenatal fraud case, the expectant mother can contract with
the physician to protect the fetus' interest in its life. The physician be-
comes the expectant mother's agent in providing medical services to the
fetus and any misrepresentation directed to the physician also is di-
rected to the expectant mother. The expectant mother is acting as the
fetus' guardian at the time, however, and the misrepresentation made
by the drug manufacturer is actually directed to the fetus, with the in-
tent that the fetus, or its representative rely.208 This theory of finding
intent to induce reliance can be applied only when the woman knows
she is pregnant and goes to the physician for prenatal care, because
prenatal fraud is an intentional tort.20 9 The requisite degree of cer-
tainty necessary to impute intent upon the drug manufacturer 210 is
present only when the expectant mother is receiving medical treatment
specifically for her prenatal care.
In summary, the drug manufacturer in the prenatal fraud case in-
tends to induce the physician to rely on the misrepresentations and also
intends to induce the expectant mother to rely under the Cohen public
misrepresentation, 2' the Crystal Pier third party communication, 2 or
misrepresentation on a representative213 theories. The manufacturer
intends the fetus to rely on the misrepresentation under the Cohen and
agency principles. Under all three theories, however, the injured party
must actually rely on the misrepresentation to recover.21 4 Since the fe-
tus cannot actually rely the inquiry must turn to the cases when indirect
204. See notes 166-176 and accompanying text supra. In any action to recover for injury to the
interests involved the ward is the real party in interest. CAL. CIV. CODE §42; Dana J. v. Superior
Court, 4 Cal. 3d 836, 840-41, 484 P.2d 595, 598, 94 Cal. Rptr. 619, 626 (1971).
205. See notes 166-176 and accompanying text supra.
206. See notes 166-167 and accompanying text supra.
207. Under this theory, the prenatal fraud plaintiff must go from the physician to the expec-
tant mother and finally to the fetus. The mere fact, however, that the plaintiff acquires the action
remotely is not sufficient justification for denying recovery.
208. See notes 194-204 and accompanying text supra.
209. See note 63 supra.
210. See notes 148-149 and accompanying text supra.
211. See notes 132-134 and accompanying text supra.
212. See notes 142-165 and accompanying text supra.
213. See notes 166-210 and accompanying text supra.
214. See notes 103-117 and accompanying text supra.
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or third person reliance enables an injured party to recover to deter-
mine if those principles apply to prenatal fraud.
B. Third Party Reliance
Fetal reliance on the misrepresentation is both difficult to imagine
and impossible to prove. Nevertheless, actual fetal reliance on the mis-
representation does not have to occur for the prenatal fraud plaintiff to
recover. The fetus can satisfy the justified reliance element of the tort if
a fraud is committed upon the attending physician or the expectant
mother and either of them relied on the misrepresentation.215
As noted earlier an agent's authorized actions are deemed to be acts
of the principal. 16 When an agent justifiably relies upon a misrepre-
sentation, therefore, the principal also has justifiably relied and the
principal can recover for the fraud committed upon the agent.21 7 This
principle is followed in cases involving the physician-patient relation-
ship. In Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc. 218 the plaintiff took a pre-
scription drug to combat arteriosclerosis but later developed cataracts
on his eyes. The manufacturer had marketed the drug as safe and free
of side effects despite controversy in the scientific community about the
drug's effectiveness and safety.219 The court permitted the deceit action
although the plaintiff neither saw nor relied upon the manufacturer's
misrepresentations. Since the attending physician was the patient's
agent, the physician's justified reliance on the misrepresentations when
prescribing the drug was sufficient for recovery.22°
This principle was also adopted in Grinnell v. Charles Pfizer & Com-
pany.221 As part of a general inoculation program, the plaintiff was
inoculated against polio using vaccine manufactured by the defendant,
and the plaintiff subsequently contracted polio from the vaccine. The
defendant's only involvement in the inoculation program was in selling
the vaccine to the sponsoring medical group, which actually conducted
and advertised the program.222 The physician who administered the
vaccine was not the plaintiff's personal physician.223 Although the de-
fendant never made any representations about the drug to the plaintiff,
215. See notes 217-235 and accompanying text infra.
216. See notes 166-167 and accompanying text supra.
217. See Grinnell v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 274 Cal. App. 2d 424, 431, 79 Cal. Rptr. 369, 378
(1969); Roberts v. Salot, 166 Cal. App. 2d 294, 333 P.2d 232 (1958); Lewis v. McClure, 127 Cal.
App. 439, 16 P.2d 166 (1932).
218. 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967).
219. Id. at 697-701, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 404-07.
220. Id. at 707-08, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 411-12.
221. 274 Cal. App. 2d 424, 79 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1969).
222. Id. at 431, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 372-73.
223. Id. at 432, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 373.
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the court permitted recovery.224 The court found that the medical
group was acting as the plaintiff's agent when the vaccine was adminis-
tered 225 and the medical group's reliance on the manufacturer's repre-
sentations about the drug "inured to the benefit" of the plaintiff.
2 26
Courts also have used the third party reliance principle when misrep-
resentations are directed at a guardian.227 In Stuart v. Halsey, Stuart &
Company228 the defendant had publicly advertised itself as an expert in
bond investment.2 2 9 The defendant's agent approached the plaintiff's
guardian and discussed possible investment opportunities for the
ward's assets.2 30 The agent represented that the suggested investments
were safe and suitable for guardianship investment, and the ward's
money was invested with the defendant.2 3 ' The bonds, however, were
not suitable for guardianship investment, and the court permitted the
ward to bring an action to recover for losses sustained when the bonds
were later sold.232 The court held the guardian's reliance on the de-
fendant's misrepresentation was sufficient for the ward to maintain an
action for relief.233 When a misrepresentation is directed toward a
guardian and injures the ward's interests, the ward thus can use the
guardian's justified reliance for his or her own action on the misrepre-
sentation.
In both Toole and Grinnell the plaintiffs were able to use the agents'
justified reliance in their own actions for relief. In both cases the mis-
representation was directed toward the medical profession. The at-
tending physician in Toole and the medical group-i-Grinnell relied
224. Id. at 441, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 378.
225. Id. Interestingly, the court did not treat the misrepresentation as a public misrepresenta-
tion, but looked rather to the misrepresentations contained in the package inserts accompanying
the drug. Id.
226. Id. The Grinnell case did not specifically involve a deceit or fraud action, but the plaintiff
was seeking recovery under a breach of warranty theory. The reliance aspect of a deceit action,
however, is similar to the reliance needed for a breach of warranty. In the warranty case the buyer
must show actual reliance on the warranty and the seller's judgment. Odell v. Frueh, 146 Cal.
App. 2d 504, 510, 304 P.2d 40, 45 (1956). Reliance occurs, however, when the seller has superior
knowledge of the qualities of a drug, or when the buyer relies upon the seller's expertise. See
Russell v. George Rose & Co., 276 Cal. App. 2d 456, 459, 80 Cal. Rptr. 755, 757 (1969); 146 Cal.
App. 2d at 509, 304 P.2d at 50. The test for reliance in a breach of warranty action is essentially
the same as when a person in a deceit action relies upon an expert opinion. See notes 115-116 and
accompanying text supra. Further support for the proposition that warranty reliance can be used
in a deceit action is found in CAL. U. COM. CODE §2721, which provides the same remedies to a
defrauded party as for a party claiming a breach of warranty. The major similarities and distinc-
tions between the warranty and deceit actions are discussed in 2 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALI-
FORNiA LAW, Sales, §52 (8th ed. 1973).
227. Stuart v. Halsey, Stuart & Co., 77 F.2d 812, 816 (lst Cir. 1935); Rainer v. Community
Mem. Hosp., 18 Cal. App. 3d 240, 255, 95 Cal. Rptr. 901, 910 (1971).
228. 77 F.2d 812 (Ist Cir. 1935).
229. Id. at 813.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 813-14.
232. Id. at 816.
233. Id.
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upon the misrepresentation; in neither case did the court require the
plaintiff to prove his own reliance.
In the prenatal fraud case, therefore, the plaintiff can use the physi-
cian's reliance to satisfy the justified reliance element of the tort. The
physician is acting as the fetus' representative at the time,234 and if the
physician relies upon the manufacturer's representations when pre-
scribing the drug, the physician's reliance inures to the benefit of the
fetus.
Similarly, the prenatal fraud plaintiff can use the guardian's reliance
on the misrepresentation. The manufacturer intends to induce the ex-
pectant mother to rely upon the misrepresentations, 235 and her justified
reliance, when she is acting as the fetus' guardian, will be imputed to
the fetus.
In summary, the prenatal fraud plaintiff can use the justified reliance
of either the attending physician or the expectant mother to satisfy the
reliance element of his or her own action. Since the physician and the
expectant mother are acting as the fetus' representatives at the time,
their reliance inures to the fetus' benefit.
CONCLUSION
The devastating effects a drug can have on the healthy development
of a fetus are well known. The person born with drug-caused defects
will be severely handicapped for life. The seriousness of the injury is
not mitigated because the injury was unforeseeable or that the manu-
facturer's conduct was innocent. When the drug was distributed with-
out adequate warnings of known hazards, however, the results are
intolerable. The injured party, unfortunately, faces a difficult struggle
to recover for the prenatal injuries.
California has long recognized that a fetus has legal rights worthy of
protection. The right to be safe from conduct which causes bodily in-
jury is included among the protections given the fetus. Since an action
for deceit is based upon common law principles, the California courts
should recognize the right of an injured party to bring an action against
the drug manufacturer for misrepresentations about the drug.
The prenatal fraud plaintiff faces a difficult problem in satisfying the
elements of a deceit action. The elements of intent by the drug manu-
facturer to induce fetal reliance and actual fetal reliance are particu-
larly troublesome. These problems, however, are not insurmountable.
The prenatal fraud plaintiff can use existing principles of the law of
234. See notes 183-189 and accompanying text supra.
235. See notes 125-215 and accompanying text supra.
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deceit in California to satisfy the elements of the tort. The drug manu-
facturer's misrepresentations are made with the intent of inducing the
attending physician and the expectant mother to rely on the misrepre-
sentation. The justified reliance of either the physician or the expectant
mother, when they are acting on behalf of the fetus in securing medical
treatment, will give the fetus a cause of action for prenatal fraud. The
most likely situation for a successful prenatal fraud action involves a
drug intended for use solely by expectant women during their preg-
nancy.
An action which grants recovery to a child for aprenatal fraud com-
mitted by the drug manufacturer is warranted. The fetus' interests de-
serve protection, and established principles governing the tort of deceit
permit the action. California's courts should recognize the action for
prenatal fraud and grant recovery when appropriate.
Robert W. Gin
